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Abstract
This paper proposes a dynamic model of duopolistic competition under behavior-
based price discrimination with the following property: in equilibrium, a firm may
reward its previous customers although long term contracts are not enforceable. A
firm can oﬀer a lower price to its previous customers than to its new customers as
a strategic means to hamper its rival to gather precise information on the young
generation of customers for subsequent profitable behavior-based pricing. The result
holds both with myopic and forward-looking, impatient enough consumers.
Keywords: Price discrimination, Dynamic pricing, Loyalty reward.
JEL: L11, L40, M31
1 Introduction
Behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) is a very simple form of price discrimination
that consists in oﬀering diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent customers according to their past
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purchase history. In practice, firms charge their own previous customers a diﬀerent price
than their new ones. This pricing strategy is already widely established in many important
industries (e.g. banks, phones, softwares, hotels, airlines and e-retailers) and is likely to
become even more prevalent with the development of new information technologies (See
OFT (2010)).
When BBPD is possible, one of the basic questions is: should firms charge higher prices
to their previous customers when they renew their purchase or to their new customers at
their first purchase ? The academic literature on BBPD often predicts that firms should
charge a lower price to their new customers. The reason is that previous customers of a
firm have revealed their relative higher preference for the good it provides, thus inducing
the firm to charge them a higher price in subsequent periods. The empirical evidence,
however, is rather mixed: Shaﬀer and Zhang (2000) for example provides many instances
in which firms charge a lower price on their previous customers. Shin and Sudhir (2010)
also notes that practitioners’ intuition leads them to think that previous customers should
be oﬀered in general better deals than new ones.
There are many examples of introductory oﬀers to new customers. Newspapers usually
oﬀer discount to their new subscribers. For instance a new subscriber for 3 months to
the French newspaper "Le Monde", pays 50 euros whereas a previous customer is charged
131.30 euros. Another example is the online retailer AuchanDirect who oﬀers a free
delivery to its new customers. A third example is the newly opened online betting industry
in France wherein operators oﬀer free bets to their new customers. For instance BetClic
and the PMU oﬀer respectively 80 euros and 50 euros to their new customers. A last
case is the antivirus software developer McAfee that tried in 2010 to make its previous
customers renew their subscriptions for 79.99 dollars, whereas it oﬀered the same software
to its new customers at 69.9 dollars. Examples of better deals to previous consumers also
exist. It is often observed in the sport industry. For instance, the Parisian rugby club
the "Stade Francais" oﬀers a discount to its customers that renew their season ticket. In
2008, for the basic season ticket a new customer paid 400 euros while a previous one only
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360 euros. The same is sometimes true in fitness clubs. The Club Vitam for instance
oﬀers 15% discount on the yearly subscription for those who renew their membership.
The Parisian Club Med Gym is also currently launching a discount campaign towards its
old consumers. A last example is Bitdefender that oﬀers 25% to 35% price reduction to
its customers that renew their subscription to its antivirus software. This last example in
combination with the McAfee case shows that better deals to new or previous customers
may arise within the same industry.
In this paper, we present a new theoretical explanation for why a firm may reward its
previous customers with better deals even though long term contracts are not enforceable.
We show that a firm can oﬀer a lower price to its previous customers than to its new
customers as a strategic means to hamper its rival to gather precise information on the
young generation of customers that it could use for subsequent profitable behavior-based
pricing.
More precisely, we consider and analyze an infinite competition two-firm model with
overlapping generations of consumers who live two periods; each generation of consumers
is made of constant and symmetric proportions of price insensitive (hereafter loyal to one
firm) consumers and price sensitive consumers (hereafter shoppers), as in Varian (1980).
Firms are able to recognize their own previous customers, but cannot distinguish between
the consumers of the young generation and the previous customers of its competitor.
Firms can then price discriminate between their previous customers and their new cus-
tomers. We characterize a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this model, which
is under mixed strategies with continuous support, as in the elementary model of Varian
(1980). This equilibrium implies higher profits for firms at the expense of consumers than
under uniform competition. More importantly, it exhibits the property that the firm that
has recognized its old loyal customers oﬀers a (stochastically) lower price to its new cus-
tomers (i.e uses a "pay to switch" or a "poaching" strategy) than to its new customers,
while its rival, that cannot tell its old loyal and the old shoppers apart, charges a (sto-
chastically) lower price to its previous customers (i.e uses a "pay to stay" or a "loyalty
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reward" strategy) than to its new customers.
The basic intuition runs as follows. The firm that has recognized its old loyal cus-
tomers, say firm 1, can extract the whole surplus from this category of consumers. It
is more aggressive on its segment of new customers that consists in the young shoppers,
the old shoppers as well as its young loyal consumers and therefore exhibits a smaller
proportion of loyal consumers. The other firm, say firm 2, has served both its old loyal
consumers and the old shoppers in the previous period; as a consequence its two segments
of new and previous customers have the same proportion of loyal consumers and shoppers.
The segment of new customers, however, contains firm 2’s young loyal customers who are
much more "valuable" than its old loyal consumers, since being able to perfectly recog-
nize them enables firm 2 to extract their surplus in the subsequent period. Recognition of
these young loyal customers requires a price high enough so that they are the only ones
from this generation who buy from the firm. As a consequence, firm 2 has an incentive
to charge a higher price on its segment of new customers than on its segment of previous
customers, so as to increase its chance to recognize its young loyal consumers.
Our main analysis is carried out with myopic consumers who only care about the
current price they pay. They do not foresee the strategic use of their purchase behavior
by firms for subsequent price discrimination and hence do not attempt to manipulate the
revelation of their preference. This assumption is likely to be relevant for new markets,
where consumers have not yet learned the firms’ pricing strategies (Armstrong (2006)).
This makes the myopic assumption fair enough for instance in the context of e-retailing
which is still a nascent sector. Turow et.al (2005) in a study about online markets reports
that two-thirds of adult Internet users surveyed believed incorrectly that it was illegal
for online retailers to charge diﬀerent people diﬀerent prices. Consequently, consumers
are unlikely to act strategically to avoid being recognized. In established industries, the
myopic assumption can also be seen as a form of bounded rationality. However our
main result on previous customers reward is robust to the consideration of fully rational
consumers as long as their discount factor for the present is low enough.
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In the terminology of Fudenberg and Villas Boas (2007) our model is one of pure-
information price discrimination as past purchases only convey information on consumers’
tastes but are not payoﬀ relevant. This branch of the literature has been pioneered
by Villas-Boas (1999) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)1. It has then been extended
in several directions: asymmetry among firms (Chen (2008) and Gehrig et.al (2011)),
changes in consumers’ preferences (Chen and Pearcy (2010) and Shin and Sudhir (2010)),
link with firms’ advertising strategies (Esteves (2009)), discrete distribution of consumers’
preferences (Chen and Zhang (2009) and Esteves (2010)), enhanced services (Aquisiti
and Varian (2005) and Pazgal and Soberman (2008)), complement goods (Kim and Choi
(2010)) and endogenous product design (Gehrig and Stenbacka (2004) and Zhang (2011)).2
Depending on the underlying consumers’ preferences and degree of patience, BBPD
has been found to be either profitable or unprofitable. Moreover, a common prediction of
these models is that firms should oﬀer lower prices to their rivals’ customers to entice them
to switch and higher prices to their own previous to capture their captive surplus. In our
model, the incentives to recognize one’s own captive customers interact with these forces,
thereby generating a high price on new customers and rewards for previous customers on
the part of the firm that has not recognized its old loyal consumers. A setting with infinite
competition and overlapping generation is a natural and somehow necessary3 modeling
assumption to have this interaction. Also in a infinite competition model with overlapping
generations of consumers, Villas-Boas (1999) finds opposite conclusions namely, BBPD
decreases firms profits and always generates poaching strategies. His model has diﬀerent
underlying preferences and a specific timing in price setting decisions for previous and
new customers that lead to the diﬀerence in predictions with ours.
1Another branch of the literature pioneered by Chen (1997) and Taylor (2003) considers environments
with ex ante homogenous goods and switching costs that cause ex post diﬀerentiation and makes history
payoﬀ relevant.
2See Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007), Esteves (2009) and Zhang (2010) for more complete literature
reviews.
3See the discussion about the two-period with a second-period new generation (See Section 3.2)
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The only paper on BBPD with short term contracts that generates previous customers
reward we are aware of is Shin and Sudhir (2010). In a model à la Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000), they allow consumers’ preferences to vary across periods and they introduce some
heterogeneity among customers with respect to the number of units they wish to buy each
period. In this context, past purchase history conveys information on both consumers
tastes and the quantity they wish to buy. They find that in markets with suﬃcient
heterogeneity in quantities demanded and large enough changes of consumers preferences,
it is optimal to reward one’s own previous, high-demand customers, since the marginal
gain in profit from cutting prices to retain them is greater than the marginal benefit of
poaching a mix of low and high demand competitors’ customers. Only one category of
previous customers is rewarded and both firms use pay-to-stay strategies. Our model
does not rely on consumers’ mobility neither do we need an additional dimension of
heterogeneity to generate previous consumers reward. Besides we predict that only one
of the two firms oﬀers a lower price to its previous customers.
Another closely related article is Chen and Zhang (2009). They use the same under-
lying consumers’ preferences as ours in a two-period model where one single generation
leaves through the two periods. Their main finding is that firms can be better oﬀ with
BBPD than without it, even when consumers behave strategically. The intuition is that,
in order to pursue customer recognition,4 competing firms need to price high to screen
out price-sensitive consumers and hence price competition is moderated. The pursuit of
loyal consumers recognition plays a similar role in our analysis as it contributes to the
profitability of BBPD, but our repeated setting implies in addition that pricing for new
customers aims at increasing the chances to win the race for customers recognition, which
results in the strategic loyalty reward phenomenon. Note also that our result holds for
myopic or strategic and relatively impatient consumers.
Introducing long term contracts is another possibility to derive loyalty rewards in the
literature on BBPD. This strand of the literature has been pioneered by Caminal and
4See also Esteves (2009) about the competition softening eﬀect of the pursuit of customers recognition
6
Matutes (1990) and has been the object of recent advances (See Chen - Pearcy (2010)).
The rationale for previous customers reward is then the creation of endogenous switching
cost through the design of the loyalty program as a way to create an opportunity cost
from switching brands.
Last, our article is also related to the literature on static models of preference-based
pricing and especially to Shaﬀer and Zhang (2000). Shaﬀer and Zhang (2000) considers a
setting with asymmetric inherited market shares and asymmetric levels of brand loyalty.
They show that when the average loyalty of the two groups of consumers is suﬃciently
dissimilar, the firm whose previous customers are the less loyal finds this segment to be
the more elastic one and hence oﬀers it a lower price. In this case the other firm charges a
lower price to its new customers. So, their result comes from diﬀerences in price elasticities
while ours is a consequence of dynamic consideration of customer recognition.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
investigates two benchmark situations that help better grasp the rationale behind loyalty
rewards: no price discrimination and price discrimination in a static environment. Section
4 provides the main analysis with myopic consumers. Section 5 extends the analysis to
forward-looking consumers. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a market for an homogenous good with overlapping generations of consumers
living two periods and two symmetric infinitely-lived firms.
Each period, a unit mass of infinitesimal consumers enters the market and stays until
the end of the next period. Consumers have a unit demand per period, with constant
per-period valuation equal to v. Within each generation, a proportion l ∈ (0, 1/2) is only
interested in buying from firm 1 and the same proportion l for firm 2; these are "loyal"
consumers. The remaining proportion s = 1− 2l may buy from either firm and are price
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sensitive; they are called "shoppers"5. All consumers discount the future at the same rate
β ∈ [0, 1) and choose whether to buy and from which firm at each period of their life.
The size of consumer segments is common knowledge to all agents.6
Firms are infinitely lived and their production costs are normalized to 0. They maxi-
mize their respective intertemporal profit streams, with common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
At each date, firms choose prices simultaneously.
The information structure is critical. First, firms observe all prices once they have been
set. Second, we assume that firms are unable to distinguish loyal consumers from shoppers
within the young generation. Third, firms may be able to collect information about the
customers they have served at the previous period and therefore they may be able to
identify their own "previous" customers when charging prices. However they cannot
distinguish between the consumers of the young generation and the previous customers
of its competitor: these are just "new" customers for them.
When firms cannot price discriminate between their previous and their new customers,
they simultaneously choose at each period one price each, pti for i = 1, 2, and then con-
sumers make their purchase decisions: it may be that the firms are unable to collect
information about their previous customers, or to keep track of them, or that they are
forbidden to charge diﬀerent prices for customers they have served and consumers they
haven’t.
When firms can price discriminate between their own previous and their new cus-
tomers, they simultaneously choose a pair of prices at each period, P ti ≡ (pto,i, ptn,i) for
firm i = 1, 2, pto,i for i’s own previous customers and p
t
n,i for i’s new customers. That is, we
only allow for short term contracts. Young consumers are necessarily new customers for
firms; old consumers may be previous or new customers for a firm at period t, depending
on whether they bought from this firm or not previously.
This framework is a dynamic game played by both firms and by the consumers. It
5Basically this is a duopoly version of Varian (1980).
6In practice, it would be expected that firms are more or less certain about the size of the segments.
Thus, our results should be interpreted as the solution to an important limit case.
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involves asymmetric information because at a given period a firm privately knows the
identity of the customers who bought from it previously. Yet, this private information only
serves to implement price discrimination between previous customers and new customers,
and it is irrelevant to compute the size of each segment served by each firm; the firms’
profits therefore do not depend on private information.
We will focus on symmetric equilibria. Moreover, to get rid of the usual source of
multiplicity due to bootstrap strategies that depend on payoﬀ-irrelevant history, we will
focus on Markov-perfect equilibria. We analyze the case of myopic consumers, where
β = 0, in Section 4. We extend our analysis to forward-looking consumers with β > 0 in
Section 5.
3 Benchmark situations
3.1 Equilibrium with no price discrimination
When price discrimination is not possible, firms choose prices (pt1, p
t
2) at each period t. At
each period, both firms face the same population of consumers and consumers face the
purchase opportunities defined by current prices, irrespective of what happened before.
In other words, at a pricing stage, the payoﬀ-relevant history is empty and, at a purchase
decision stage, the payoﬀ-relevant history only consists in current prices. The game is
therefore a stationary repeated game and symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria coincide
with the play of static Nash equilibria for every period.
In equilibrium, consumers behavior is immediate. Loyal consumers buy provided the
price does not exceed v; shoppers buy from the lowest price firm, provided its price does
not exceed v. Firms will not charge prices above v. Moreover, when firm j chooses current
price pj, firm i’s profit when choosing pi consists in its profit on loyal consumers, equal
to 2lpi, and its profit on shoppers, equal to 2spi when its price pi is smaller than pj, and
equal to spi when pi = pj.7 The model reduces to the infinite repetition of a one-shot
7In this simple model, the form of profits in case of a tie can be viewed as the outcome of a standard
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game à la Varian (1980). The analysis is omitted and the equilibrium can be shown to be
unique within the class of Markov-perfect equilibria, as in Varian (1980); it is in mixed
strategies and characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Varian, 1980): There exists a unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilib-
rium when discrimination is not possible; it is in mixed (stationary) behavioral strategies
such that, at each period, each firm chooses its price by mixing according to a price de-
cumulative distribution function (d.d.f.8) F (p) = l(v−p)sp , defined on [p∗, v] with p∗ =
vl
l+s .
The equilibrium intertemporal valuation for a firm is given by V = 2lv
1−δ .
3.2 Static equilibrium with price discrimination
Let us now focus on a static game that corresponds to one period of the dynamic game
with price discrimination with an asymmetric history. This game is a useful benchmark
as it enables us to capture the strategic interaction due to the imperfect overlap of the
populations of potential customers for the firms, absent any intertemporal considerations.
It corresponds to the game with price discrimination when β = δ = 0.
Both firms can identify two segments of customers each and can price discriminate
between them. One firm, called the H-firm, faces one segment (price po,H) consisting in l
loyal customers, the H-firm’s own previous customers, and another segment (price pn,H)
consisting in l other loyal consumers and all the 2s shoppers.9 The other firm, called the
equal sharing rule of market demand; it can also be viewed as the expected outcome of a stochastic rule
such that, with probability 1/2, all shoppers patronize one firm, and with probability 1/2 they patronize
the other one. The second tie breaking rule turns out to be more convenient in the main model, as
explained later on.
8A decumulative distribution function for a real-valued random variable X˜ is defined as F (x) =
Pr{X˜ > x} = 1 − Pr{X˜ ≤ x}; hence, it is càdlàg, i.e. it is continuous on a right neighborhood of any
point x and it admits a limit at x going from the left.
9The "H" (resp. "L") comes from the fact that, in the dynamic version, this firm must have been
the one that charged the highest (resp. lowest) price at the previous period, which enabled it to identify
the segment of its "own previous" loyal customers, in contrast with the segment of its "new" customers
(hence the "o" and the "n" indices).
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L-firm, faces two identical segments, consisting of l loyal consumers and s shoppers each;
one of them (price po,L) can be viewed as consisting in the firm’s previous customers,
the other one (price pn,L) consisting in new-born consumers. The H-firm will obviously
charge po,H = v on the segment of identified previous loyal customers. Figuring out the
static equilibrium in prices in this situation involves solving a problem à la Varian with
two price instruments and overlapping segments of consumers. We merely state the result
and omit the proof that follows the same technical steps as Narasimhan (1988).10
Proposition 2 : In the static price setting game with price discrimination, there exists
no pure strategy equilibrium; in any mixed strategy equilibrium, pn,H is distributed accord-
ing to the absolutely continuous d.d.f. HS(p) = (1−s)(v−p)
2sp on [a
S, v], with aS = 1−s
1+sv, po,L
and pn,L are jointly distributed on [aS, v]2 so that, letting LSo (.) and L
S
n(.) denote the mar-
ginal d.d.f. w.r.t. po,L and pn,L of the joint d.d.f., LSo (p) + L
S
n(p) =
(1−s)( 1+3s
1+s v−p)
2sp within
[aS, v) and there exists a mass point of LSo (.)+L
S
n(.) at v equal to
1−s
1+s ; finally, in any mixed
strategy equilibria, the intertemporal profits are V SL = (1−s)v and V SH = (1−s)v(1+ s1+s).
In this asymmetric game, the firm that perfectly identifies some of its loyal customers
(the H-firm) has a clear strategic advantage: it enjoys full monopoly on these customers
and can aﬀord being aggressive on its other segment since the proportion of loyal in it is
rather small. By contrast, the L-firm is in an inferior position and cannot be too aggressive
on both its segments as, in each segment, the proportion of loyal consumers is rather high
and the firm does not want to forego the profit it can extract from these loyal consumers.
Indeed, V SL < V
S
H .
The structure of prices for the L-firm is indeterminate. Indeed, several possible con-
figurations are possible since no other restriction is imposed by the equilibrium condition,
such as:
• symmetric independent pricing by the L-firm: po,L and pn,L are independently dis-
tributed according to the d.d.f. LS(p) = 1
2
(
(1−s)( 1+3s
1+s v−p)
2sp );
10The precise derivation of the price distribution and of the critical thresholds can be obtained as a
special case of the preliminary step in the proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix.
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• de facto no price discrimination by the L-firm: po,L = pn,L distributed according to
LS(.) and the L-firm handles both segments on equal terms;
• surplus extraction on segment j and aggressive pricing on segment i by the L-firm:
pi,L and pj,L have disjoint and adjacent supports, pi,L ∈ [aS, (1−s)(1+3s)(1+s)2 v], pj,L ∈
[ (1−s)(1+3s)
(1+s)2 v, v] (with a mass point at v), so that the L-firm charges (stochastically)
a high price on segment j and a low prices on segment i.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the H-firm’s payoﬀs must be constant over the range
of randomization. So, mixing by the L-firm has to satisfy: Pr{po,L > p} + Pr{pn,L >
p} = 2LS(p). A symmetric policy implies: Pr{po,L > p} = Pr{pn,L > p} = LS(p).
More aggressive pricing on some segment i, i.e. shifting some probability weight on lower
values of the price pi,L, must go along with less aggressive pricing on the other segment,
i.e. shifting probability weight on higher values of pj,L. The L-firm cannot fight more
fiercely on both fronts, compared to the symmetric pricing policy. In this knife-edge
situation, the two segments of consumers faced by the L-firm are perfectly symmetric and
the equilibrium implies playing aggressive on one half of the consumers and extracting
more surplus on the other half.
When j = o and i = n, the L-firm extracts more surplus from its own previous cus-
tomers, which is a common characteristics of behavior-based price discrimination; indeed,
so does the H-firm with po,H = v. When j = n and i = o, the L-firm strategy exhibits pre-
vious customers reward (loyalty reward), a more unusual prediction. But the multiplicity
of equilibrium strategies in this static framework does not allow to conclude convincingly.
4 Price discrimination with myopic consumers
We now turn to the dynamic situation in which firms can price discriminate between
their own previous and new customers and consumers are myopic, that is: β = 0. This
assumption rules out intertemporal strategic considerations; solving for consumers’ short
run best response is immediate and the game basically reduces to a game between the
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firms. The analysis in this section can also be viewed as characterizing a situation of
limited rationality from consumers who are unable to figure out future prices.
Payoﬀ-relevant history from the consumers’ viewpoint consists in current prices and
which firm, if any, they patronized previously. At any period t, loyal consumers buy if and
only if the price of their matching firm is not larger than v. Shoppers, at any period t, buy
from the firm oﬀering the lowest price available to them (as a previous customer or a new
customer for the firms), provided this price does not exceed v. In case of a tie, we assume
that with probability 1/2 all shoppers patronize one of the firm and with probability 1/2
they patronize the other one. Compared to the more standard tie breaking rule, in which
1/2 consumers split equally among the firms, our rule makes no diﬀerence in terms of
current expected profits; however, next period, it implies that all shoppers are previous
customers of the same firm and the other firm’s previous customers are all loyals of that
firm. This enables us to simplify the description of the payoﬀ-relevant history at any
period and it drastically simplifies the characterization of equilibrium strategies.11
Let us restrict attention to prices within [0, v].12 Suppose that (P t−11 , P
t−1
2 ) ∈ [0, v]4
prevailed at period t−1. At period t, firm i has private information about each consumer,
identifying whether he is a previous or a new customer of firm i. When firms choose prices
(P t1, P
t
2) ∈ [0, v]4, they use their private information to implement price discrimination
that is to allow a previous (resp. new) customer to be oﬀered a price pto,i (resp. p
t
n,i).
11More precisely, the conventional tie breaking rule delivers the same characterization of equilibrium
strategies on the equilibrium path as in our model, but it requires to specify strategies also after an
event of equal split of shoppers facing equal prices, an event that occurs with zero probability on the
equilibrium path: since the specification of the strategies in these events does not convey additional
economic intuition, we have chosen a tie-breaking rule that makes such events impossible even after
deviations.
12As is intuitive, prices cannot be larger than v in equilibrium. Allowing prices to fall above v and
describing equilibrium strategies after some deviation above v is however extremely heavy. We choose
not to present these complications in this section. The proof of proposition 6, however, explains, in the
general case of strategic consumers, how to deal with such price deviations and what are continuation
strategies.
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When such price-discriminating policy is implemented, firm i’s total demand and profit
simply depend on (P t1, P
t
2) and on whether it served the shoppers born at t − 1 or not,
since that determines the composition of their respective segments of potential customers.
Profits therefore depend solely on public information, private information is not relevant
at the price setting stage. In other words, there exists a public suﬃcient statistics for the
whole payoﬀ-relevant history that corresponds to the identity of the firm who served the
shoppers born at t− 1: either firm 1 served all shoppers born at t− 1, i.e. (P t−11 , P t−12 ) is
such that pt−1n,1 < p
t−1
n,2 (or p
t−1
n,1 = p
t−1
n,2 and all shoppers patronized firm 1), or firm 2 served
them all, i.e. when pt−1n,2 < p
t−1
n,1 or (p
t−1
n,1 = p
t−1
n,2 and all shoppers patronized firm 2).
To ease notation, we will thereafter change the labeling of firms: we let PL = (po,L, pn,L)
denote the prices of the L-firm, that is the firm that served all the shoppers born at the
previous period, PH = (po,H , pn,H) the pricing rule for the H-firm, that is the firm that
had the highest price and served no shoppers. Similarly, we let VL and VH denote the
intertemporal valuations starting from the current period for the L-firm and the H-firm.
We focus on symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria in which firms choose their prices based
solely on whether they are the (current) H-firm or L-firm, and consumers make their
purchase decisions based solely on the current prices available to them, given which firm,
if any, they patronize previously.
Our first result is not surprising given the underlying preferences of consumers: there
exists no symmetric pure-strategy Markov-perfect equilibrium. The result is however not
immediate to prove in our setting as short term gains from price undercutting have to
be compared with long-term losses, due to the change in the state variable characterizing
whether the firm is the L-firm or the H-firm, and long-term losses are endogenous.13
Proposition 3 : There exists no pure strategy symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium of
the game of price discrimination with myopic consumers.
Therefore, we now focus on symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria that involve mixing.
13The non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium is robust to the choice of the tie breaking rule; it is
however much more tedious to prove with the equal split rule than with our stochastic tie-breaking rule.
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Note, though, that in equilibrium, we necessarily have: po,H = v. So, an equilibrium is
characterized by a d.d.f. H(.) for pn,H , and a (joint) distribution for (po,L, pn,L) charac-
terized by its marginal d.d.f. Lo(.) and Ln(.) with respect to po,L and pn,L.
Let us provide some intuition about the construction of our equilibrium. We must
first emphasize that the standard approach, e.g. Narasimhan (1988), is not useful in our
model for the very same reason that the standard proof of non-existence of pure strategy
equilibrium fails. Small changes in prices for new customers have a short-term impact in
terms of current market shares among shoppers and current profit margins, as well as a
long term impact through a change in the probability distribution of the state variable.
If mass points could be ruled out a priori, the approach à la Narasimhan (1988) would
still allow us to determine the interval support of H(.) and of the union of the supports
of Lo(.) and Ln(.). But mass points cannot be ruled out a priori and when prices are
changed around a mass point in the mixed strategies, the comparison between the short
term and the long term impacts requires the full construction of the continuation payoﬀs
as a function of the state variable.
Following the discussion of Proposition 2, we look for an equilibrium with strategies
that reward previous customers, i.e. with the following features:
• for any realization of prices in R+, the state variable characterizes which firm had
the lowest price for new consumers at the previous period (or which firm served all
the shoppers in case of equal prices for new consumers at the previous period);
• the support of H(.) is [p, v], the support of Lo(.) is [p, pˆ], the support of Ln(.) is
[pˆ, v];
• H(.), and Lo(.) are absolutely continuous, while Ln(.) has a mass point at v.
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An equilibrium of this type should satisfy the following equilibrium conditions:
VL = max
po≤v
po[l + sH(po)] (1)
+max
pn≤v
{pn[l + sH(pn)] + δVLH(pn) + δVH(1−H(pn))}
= p(l + s) + vl + δVH (2)
= pˆ(l + sH(pˆ)) + vl + δVH (3)
= p(l + s) + pˆ(l + sH(pˆ)) + δVLH(pˆ) + δVH(1−H(pˆ)), (4)
VH = vl + (5)
max
q<v
{q[l + sLo(q) + sLn(q)] + δVLLn(q) + δVH(1− Ln(q))}
= vl + p(l + 2s) + δVL = vl + pˆ(l + s) + δVL (6)
≥ vl + v(l + s
2
Ln(v)) + δVH(1− Ln(v)) + δ
VL + VH
2
Ln(v). (7)
The main lines ((1) and (5)) rule out profitable deviations below v, the subsequent
lines make explicit the indiﬀerence or dominance relations when pricing occurs at one of
the threshold p, pˆ or v. It is a simple, although tedious, matter to solve for the vari-
ables (p, pˆ,H(pˆ), VH , VL) that completely determine the candidate equilibrium and subse-
quently, to check that indeed no deviation is profitable for any payoﬀ-relevant history. We
obtain the following characterization result of a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 4 : In the model of price discrimination with myopic consumers, there
exists a unique equilibrium with previous customers reward of the posited form:
p and pˆ are characterized by:
v
p
=
1 + s
1− s −
4s2
(1− s)(1 + 3s)
δ
1 + δ
v
pˆ
=
(1 + s)2
(1− s)(1 + 3s) −
4s2(1 + s)
(1− s)(1 + 3s)2
δ
1 + δ
;
the L-firm charges random prices (po,L, pn,L) given by the marginal d.d.f. with disjoint
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adjacent supports:
Lo(p) =
(1 + s)(pˆ− p)
2sp
on [p, pˆ]
Ln(p) =
(1 + s)pˆ− δ
1+δ2sp− (1− s)p
2sp− δ
1+δ2sp
on [pˆ, v)
and Ln(.) has a mass λ = 1−s1+s at v;
the H-firm charges po,H = v on its old customers and pn,H according to the d.d.f.
H(p) =
(1 + s)p− (1− s)p
2sp
on [p, pˆ]
=
(1− s)(v − p)
2sp− δ
1+δ2sp
on [pˆ, v];
The intertemporal value functions are given by:
VL =
(1 + s)p
1− δ [1 +
s
1 + 3s
δ
1 + δ
]
VH =
p
1− δ [1 + 2s−
δs
1 + δ
(1 +
2s
1 + 3s
)] = VL +
sp
1 + δ
.
The equilibrium characterized in the previous proposition exhibits a remarkable fea-
ture: the L-firm charges uniformly lower prices for its own previous customers than for its
new customers, i.e. its previous customers are rewarded in equilibrium. This feature is
in striking contrast with the usually described pricing strategies in behavior-based price
discrimination models in which, firms usually extract more surplus from their previous
customers than from the consumers they have never served.
In our model, the firm that has perfectly identified its previous loyal customers actually
extracts all their surplus (po,H = v). To understand the L-firm’s behavior, we can start
from the intuition given in the static framework after Proposition 2. If the firm that has
not identified its customers (the L-firm) adopts an asymmetric pricing strategy, choosing
a stochastically low price po,L for its own previous customers, it is more aggressive with
respect to the rival and to ensure the rival is willing to mix, it has to adopt a stochastically
high price pn,L for its new customers. The dynamic setting introduces a new eﬀect:
charging a high price pn,L on new customers enables the L-firm to become with high
probability the future H-firm, that is the firm that identifies its loyal customers and is
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able to extract their surplus later on. The profitability of the H-firm position at t + 1
therefore creates an additional incentive at t for shifting probability weight on high values
of pn,L, and consequently for shifting probability weight on low values of po,L, i.e. for
increasing loyalty reward. Note that it similarly creates an incentive for the H-firm to
charge higher prices towards its new customers, i.e. to shift probability weight on higher
values of pn,H compared to the situation with δ = 0.
Our model therefore enables us to characterize a behavior that consists in rewarding
previous customers, which does not hinges on the use of long-term contracts. The ar-
gument relies on the profitability of identifying one’s young loyal consumers and on the
impossibility of discriminating among old and young shoppers when the firm has never
served any of them.
Unsurprisingly, when δ goes to 0, the equilibrium above converges to the repetition
of the static equilibrium in Proposition 2. The dynamic race to the H-firm position then
vanishes. As δ increases, it is easy to prove that p and pˆ increase and that the price
distributions shift in the sense of first order stochastic dominance so that higher prices
become more likely: price competition becomes less intense as δ increases, i.e. as the
incentives to enter a race for the H-firm position become more pregnant. Also, when δ
increases, the per-period profit of the L-firm improves while the per-period profit of the H-
firm position diminishes: (1−δ)VL increases and (1−δ)VH decreases. The L-firm engages
in a race to ensure the next H-firm position and therefore enjoys the benefits associated
to the H-position eventually; similarly, the H-firm does not secure the H-position for ever.
Corollary 5 Behavior-based price discrimination, when it results in the equilibrium with
previous consumers reward, increases the profits of both firms at the expense of consumers.
It is immediate to check that VJ > V for J = H,L, which means that behavior-based
price discrimination boosts the industry profits in comparison with uniform price com-
petition. This result is driven by the surplus appropriation eﬀect of price discrimination
against recognized old captive customers and the related pursuit of young loyal customers
recognition. It is in line with Chen and Zhang (2009). But, here a novelty arises in the
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sense that even the firm that did not recognize its old loyal customers derives a higher
profit on its segment of previous customers. This eﬀect is a direct consequence of the
loyalty reward: it is due to the infinite nature of competition and to the structure of
information available to firms that make the L-firm benefit, on its segment of previous
customers, from the price softening eﬀect induced by the race for young consumers recog-
nition. In our model, welfare does not depend on the type of competition and is fixed to
2v by period. Consequently the profit boosting eﬀect from price discrimination comes at
the expense of the consumer surplus.
The advantage of becoming the H-firm constitutes an incentive for both firms to charge
higher prices for their new customers; by the same token, it also implies that the other
equilibrium configurations that appeared in the static framework do not constitute equilib-
rium configurations anymore in a dynamic context, as they relied on a knife-edge strategic
indiﬀerence between both price components of the L-firm. Given the diﬃculty of con-
structing the whole continuation valuations for any possible equilibrium configurations,
we have not been able to prove that any symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium is neces-
sarily such that it rewards old customers. However following a similar construction as in
our main existence result, we can exhibit a set of impossibility results for several natural
configurations:14
• there exists no symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium such that all prices except
po,H are drawn from absolutely continuous mixed strategies H(.), Lo(.), and Ln(.);
• there exists no symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium such that the L-firm de facto
does not price discriminate between its previous and its new customers, i.e. such
that po,L = pn,L;
• there exists no symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (with absolutely continuous
d.d.f. except perhaps at v) such that the L-firm extracts surplus from its previous
14The proofs of these claims mimic the proof in Proposition 4 until they lead to a contradiction.
Reaching the final contradiction, however, requires to compute all equilibrium variables, a tedious and
insightless approach that we have chosen to skip.
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customers and charges low prices on its new customers, i.e. such that Pr{pn,L <
po,L} = 1.
The first impossibility result shows that any mixed strategy equilibrium involves mass
points in the price distribution, which, as explained before, requires a full analysis of
the global long term consequences of local changes in prices. Proposition 4 falls short
of proposing a uniqueness result precisely because of the diﬃculty in dealing with the
possibility of mass points. The second result shows that the L-firm has a strict incentive
in discriminating among its customers, contrary to the static result in Proposition 2;
as suggested earlier, this is due to the desirability of acquiring the H-firm position in a
dynamic context. The last result rules out more aggressive prices on new customers than
on previous customers, a configuration that was also possible in the static model.
5 Price discrimination with forward-looking consumers
We now turn to the case of non-myopic consumers: β > 0. Consumers’ behavior can
exhibit two types of patterns that were absent in the previous section: a young loyal
consumer may decide not to buy so as to avoid being identified and being charged an
excessive price by his favorite firm when old; and a young shopper may decide either not
to buy or even to buy from the highest-price firm so as to benefit from a more advantageous
array of prices when old.
The equilibrium with loyalty reward exhibited in Proposition 4 is disrupted by such
strategic manipulation. Suppose v > ptn,1 > p
t
n,2, which is possible since H(.) and Ln(.)
overlap in a right neighborhood of v, so that at t + 1 firm 1 will become the H-firm. If
he buys from firm 1, a young consumer loyal to firm 1 is identified as a loyal customer
and is charged pt+1o,H = v, which leaves him with no surplus when old. If instead the
consumer does not buy when young, he will face a price distribution H(.) when old, the
expectation of which is bounded away from v: in expectation, he will therefore enjoy a
positive surplus, which makes this deviation profitable even for small β when ptn,1 is close
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enough to v. This suggests that firms cannot charge prices too close to v in equilibrium.
As in the previous section, we cannot pursue the ambition of characterizing all equi-
libria. The definition of an equilibrium itself requires some clarification with strategic
consumers. Consumers’ demand cannot be mechanically determined as previously, since
young consumers’ choices depend on their expectations about the future prices. Moreover,
the state variable that describes the payoﬀ-relevant history should record the proportions
of loyal consumers and of shoppers served by each firm. Properly defining general Markov-
perfect equilibria in our setting would therefore be quite cumbersome.15 In the following,
we adopt a more modest approach. We present a mild modification of the Markovian
strategies of our previous equilibrium with loyalty reward and show that, for a range of
small discount factors β, they support a (Markov-perfect) equilibrium in the following
sense: no firm and no (individual) consumer has any profitable deviation after any his-
tory of prices either on the equilibrium path or oﬀ the equilibrium path, in any subgame
subsequent to a price deviation by one firm.16
More precisely, let the L-firm at period t be the firm who had the lowest price for its
segment of new customers at period t− 1; the other firm is the H-firm. Strategies on the
equilibrium path are as follows: the H-firm charges po,H = v and chooses pn,H according
to a d.d.f. H∗(.) with support [a, a¯], form some a¯ ≤ v; the L-firm chooses (po,L, pn,L)
according to a joint distribution with marginal d.d.f. L∗o(.) and L
∗
n(.) respectively, L
∗
o(.)
has support [a, aˆ] and L∗n(.) has support [aˆ, a¯] with a mass at a¯; young consumers purchase
at the lowest acceptable price to them if and only if this price is not larger than a¯, and they
15On the general theory of Markov-perfect equilibria, see Maskin - Tirole (2001). In our setting in
which only prices are observed, tools developed by Fershtman and Pakes (2009) should be used.
16Note first that since strategies are mixed, so the issue is about deviating on prices above the maximal
observable price (low prices can be easily handled). We omit the description of strategies in subgames
following price deviations by both firms above the maximal observable price. This enables us to reduce
the possible values of the state variables to the H-firm / L-firm statistics and the proportion of loyal
consumers served when a price exceeds the maximal observable price. A full description of strategies,
and of the associated Markov-perfect equilibrium, is possible but it would require an extremely heavy
presentation and Appendix, without any economic insights.
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refrain from consuming when the lowest acceptable price is larger than a¯; old consumers
follow their static dominant strategy, as previously. These behaviors are similar to the
ones generated by the equilibrium with reward of previous customers when consumers are
myopic, except for the maximal price a¯ that firms can charge in equilibrium.
The description of the strategies oﬀ the equilibrium path is presented in the Appendix.
In subgames following any price deviation below aˆ or a, the same behavior as on the
equilibrium path is prescribed. After a deviation on a price above a¯ at t−1, the prescribed
behavior at t relies on similar price distributions, with the same maximal price a¯ and
other thresholds aˆθ and aθ determined by the proportion θ of loyal consumers served
by the deviating firm at t − 1, followed by a reversion to the on-the-equilibrium-path
behavior from period t+1 on, or repeated in case again of a deviation at t. The maximal
price a¯ is determined so that no individual consumer has an incentive to deviate from the
straightforward behavior he would follow if he were myopic, provided firms price below
a¯, but not all young loyals consumers of a firm purchase from this firm when it charges a
price above a¯.
As suggested above, the possibility that consumers strategically refrain from buying
when young so as to ensure better conditions when old implies that the maximal price
a¯ will be strictly smaller than v. The next proposition shows in what sense Proposition
4 is robust to forward-looking consumers: the above described behaviors are part of
equilibrium strategies in the general case of non-myopic, but impatient enough consumers.
Proposition 6 : For small enough values of the consumers’ discount factor β, there
exists an equilibrium with reward of previous customers by the L-firm, characterized by a
maximal price a¯ strictly smaller than v.
Proposition 6 shows that strategic loyalty rewards can survive to the intertemporal
considerations of forward-looking consumers. When consumers become very patient, the
equilibrium is likely to be qualitatively diﬀerent with consumers who forgo their purchase
when young to have a better price when old. The characterization of such equilibria is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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A last remark is worth mentioning regarding the interpretation of market segmen-
tation. In the marketing and the economics literature, the model of Varian (1980) is
indiﬀerently used to model heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences (loyal consumers vs
price-sensitive consumers) or in consumers’ information (uniformed consumers who know
only one price vs informed consumers who know all prices). These two interpretations
usually make no diﬀerence for the resolution of the model. But, in our analysis, the inter-
pretation matters. Under the preference interpretation that we have adopted, consumers
know the prices charged by all firms and consequently perfectly anticipate which firm
will become the H-firm or the L-firm and can react accordingly. Under the informational
interpretation, captive consumers do not observe the prices oﬀered by their non-preferred
firm and consequently do not know which firm will become the H-firm or the L-firm. They
must form expectations, based on the price they are oﬀered and their knowledge of the
equilibrium price distributions. This would require an even higher computational capa-
bility for consumers than in the preference interpretation. We do not formally address
this issue.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed an infinite competition model with overlapping gener-
ations and firms that are able to recognize their own previous customers when charging
prices. A symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium of this game exhibits interesting proper-
ties regarding which segments of customers (i.e previous or new customers) a firm should
oﬀer a better price. We found that the firm that has recognized its old loyal customers
charges a lower price to its new customers than to its own previous customers. But we
showed that the firm that did not recognize its old captive consumers charges its previous
customers a lower price, in contrast with much of the literature on behavior-based price
discrimination. This loyalty reward is a strategic means to hamper its rival to recognize
its young loyal consumers. These results hold for myopic consumers and forward-looking
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consumers as long as their discount factor is not too high.
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A Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose there exists a pure strategy equilibrium, characterized by equilibrium prices
po,L, pn,L, po,H , pn,H .
The price po,L targets old loyal customers of the L-firm and competes with pn,H for
old shoppers that bought from the L-firm. Therefore, in equilibrium, it cannot be that
po,L < pn,H , as po,L could be increased profitably; it cannot be that pn,H < po,L < v either,
since po,L could be increased up to v profitably, and it cannot be that po,L = pn,H , since
po,L could be slightly decreased with a jump in demand. This implies that po,L = v. po,H
only targets old loyal customers of the H-firm and should therefore be set at v.
In equilibrium, it cannot be that pn,L < pn,H , since then pn,L could be increase prof-
itably. Similarly for the strict reverse inequality. Therefore, one must have pn,L = pn,H =
p. So, it comes:
VL = vl + p(l +
s
2
) + δ
VH + VL
2
VH = vl + p(l +
3s
2
) + δ
VH + VL
2
.
From these, it immediately follows that: VH − VL = ps > 0.
The L-firm prefers charging po,L = v instead of po,L = p− ε, for ε small, which would
enable it to serve the old shoppers: that is, it is necessary that:
vl ≥ p(l + s). (8)
The L-firm also prefers charging pn,L = p instead of charging pn,L = v−ε, which would
enable it to enjoy a high mark-up on its young loyal customers and to become the next
H-firm for sure: that is, it is necessary that:
p(l +
s
2
) + δ
VH + VL
2
≥ vl + δVH . (9)
Since VH > VL, VH > VH+VL2 ; also vl ≥ p(l + s) implies that vl > p(l +
s
2
). Therefore
(9) cannot be satisfied.
Consequently, there does not exist a symmetric Markov perfect pure strategy equilib-
rium.
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B Proof of Proposition 4
Under the assumption about the form of the equilibrium, one can obtain the following
necessary conditions by writing down the optimality of q = p, q = pˆ, po = p, pn = v,
po = pˆ, and pn = pˆ:
VH = vl + p(l + 2s) + δVL
p(l + 2s) = pˆ(l + s)
VL = p(l + s) + vl + δVH
p(l + s) = pˆ(l + sH(pˆ))
vl = pˆ(l + sH(pˆ))− δ(VH − VL)H(pˆ).
It is a simple, although tedious, matter of computation to solve this system of 5
equations within the 5 variables (p, pˆ,H(pˆ), VH , VL) and to obtain the expressions in the
proposition. Note, for further reference, that a side result is:
(1 + δ)(VH − VL) = (l + s)(pˆ− p) = sp > 0.
It follows:
VL =
vl + (s+ l)p
1− δ +
δsp
1− δ2
VH =
vl + (s+ l)p
1− δ +
sp
1− δ2
.
The expressions for p and pˆ show trivially that 0 < p < pˆ < v. Simple computations
also show that Lo(p) = 1, Lo(pˆ) = 0, Ln(pˆ) = 1, H(p) = 1, H(.) is continuous at pˆ and
H(v) = 0. Moreover, Lo(.), Ln(.) and H(.) are strictly decreasing. Using the expression
of vp , it is a simple matter of tedious computation to prove that: λ =
1−s
1+s , hence λ > 0.
We now investigate possible deviations, assuming that firms’ continuation strategies
are of the same nature, depending on which firm oﬀered the highest / lowest price previ-
ously to new consumers, even if this price is below p. Indeed, deviations below p have no
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future impact and only limits the margin earned by a firm: they cannot be profitable.17
What about deviation within [p, v]? Given H(.), let us consider the L-firm’s possible
deviations to po ∈ (pˆ, v]: then, po[l + sH(po)] = vl + δ1+δsp
(v−po)
spo− δ1+δ sp
, which is decreasing
in po, hence smaller than its value for pˆ. There is no profitable deviation for the L-firm
with respect to po. Let us consider L-firm’s deviations to pn ∈ [p, pˆ): then,
pn[l+sH(pn)]−δH(pn)(VH−VL)+δVH = (s+l)p+
δl
s
(VH−VL)−
δ(VH − VL)(s+ l)p
spn
+δVH ,
which is increasing in pn, and therefore smaller than its value for pˆ. Therefore, there is
no deviation for the L-firm with respect to pn either.
Given Lo(.) and Ln(.), the only possibly profitable deviation for the H-firm could be
to charge q = v. When the H-firm charges q and q ↑ v, its profit on new customers is:
v(l + sλ) + δλVL + δ(1− λ)VH
while by charging exactly q = v, the H-firm gets:
v(l + s
λ
2
) + δλ
VH + VL
2
+ δ(1− λ)VH
on new customers. The deviation on q = v is unprofitable if and only if: vs ≥ δ(VH −
VL)⇐⇒ v ≥ p δ1+δ , which is trivially true.
This completes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 6
Preliminary step: a mixed strategy equilibrium in an auxiliary game.
Fix parameters θ ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ [0, v] and ∆ > 0, such that: δ∆ < xs.
17We have a priori restricted prices to be not larger than v. It is possible to relax this restriction
and prove that firms will not charge above v. This requires to specify the strategies in continuation
subgames after a deviation above v: this can be done as a special case of the proof of Proposition 6. The
construction, however, is rather involved and in the current proof, we have chosen the a priori restriction
in order to facilitate the reading.
30
Consider a one-period game between a so-calledHθ-firm and a so-called Lθ-firm, facing
a global population of 2l loyal consumers for each firm and 2s shoppers. All consumers
are myopic. The Hθ-firm has identified a group of θl loyal customers to whom it can
propose a price q0, and a group of (2− θ)l+2s consumers, among whom (2− θ)l are loyal
consumers and 2s are shoppers, and to whom it can propose a price q. The Lθ-firm can
propose a price po to a group consisting of l loyal consumers and s shoppers and a price
pn to a group consisting of the other l loyal consumers and s shoppers. On top of revenue
from sales, if q > pn the Hθ-firm gets a bonus equal to δ∆, if pn > q the Lθ-firm gets this
same bonus; in case of equal prices, the bonus is granted with equal probability to one
firm or the other. Finally, suppose prices (q, po, pn) are constrained to belong to [0, x].
We look for a mixed strategy equilibrium of this auxiliary game of the following form:
• the Hθ-firm charges q0 = v and draws q according to the d.d.f. Hθ(.) with support
[a, x);
• the Lθ-firm draws po and pn according to Lθo(.) on [a, aˆ] and Lθn(.) on [aˆ, x] with a
mass point at x.
Consider the following system with unknown variables (a, aˆ, Hˆ):
a(l + s) = aˆ(l + sHˆ) = lx+ δ∆Hˆ
a((2− θ)l + 2s) = aˆ((2− θ)l + s).
The solution is given by:
Hˆθ =
(1− θ)l + s
(2− θ)l + 2s
aˆθ(x,∆) =
xl + δ∆Hˆθ
l + sHˆθ
aθ(x,∆) =
xl + δ∆Hˆθ
l + s
.
This solution is such that for all θ ∈ [0, 1), x ∈ [0, v] and ∆ > 0, Hˆθ ∈ (0, 1) and
aˆθ(x,∆) > aθ(x,∆) > 0. Moreover, aˆθ(x,∆) < x⇔ δ∆ < xs.
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The overall price distributions are given by:
p(l + sHθ(p)) = a(l + s) for p ∈ (a, aˆ)
p(l + sHθ(p)) + δ∆(1−Hθ(p)) = xl + δ∆ for p ∈ (aˆ, x)
p((2− θ)l + s+ sLθo(p)) = a((2− θ)l + 2s) for p ∈ (a, aˆ)
p((2− θ)l + sLθn(p)) + δ∆(1− Lθn(p)) = aˆ((2− θ)l + s) for p ∈ (aˆ, x).
It is immediate to check that these equalities define d.d.f, that limp→xHθ(p) = 0,
limp→aˆ Lθo(p) = 0 and limp→x L
θ
n(p) =
[(2−θ)l+s]θl
[(2−θ)l+2s]l+s[(1−θ)l+s] [sx−δ∆] > 0, which corresponds
to the mass at x.
Finally, note that Hˆθ decreases in θ. So, aθ(x,∆) decreases in θ while aˆθ(x,∆) increases
in θ. Moreover, it is immediate to show that the cumulative distribution function 1−Hθ(.)
increases in θ: so, when θ increases, the distribution of prices q changes to smaller prices
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. EHθ [q] is a continuously diﬀerentiable
decreasing function of θ, with bounded derivative for θ ∈ [0, 1].
Step 1: necessary condition based on the analysis of firms’ behavior on
the equilibrium path.
Consider first the firms’ behaviors. Fix a¯. Let us characterize the variables (a, aˆ,H∗(aˆ), V ∗L , V
∗
H)
that can possibly form equilibrium strategies for given a¯, assuming consumers behave as
posited. The analysis is similar to the analysis of the case with myopic consumers, with
a¯ instead of v as the maximal possible price. The following must then hold:
V ∗H = vl + a(l + 2s) + δV
∗
L (10)
a(l + 2s) = aˆ(l + s) (11)
V ∗L = a(l + s) + a¯l + δV
∗
H (12)
a(l + s) = aˆ(l + sH∗(aˆ)) (13)
a¯l = aˆ(l + sH∗(aˆ))− δ(V ∗H − V ∗L )H∗(aˆ). (14)
From (10) and (12), one gets:
V ∗H − V ∗L =
(v − a¯)l + as
1 + δ
.
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Then, using the preliminary step with θ = 1, x = a¯ and ∆ = V ∗H −V ∗L =
(v−a¯)l+as
1+δ , and
using the notation φ = δ
1+δ , it comes:
H∗(aˆ) =
s
l + 2s
=
2s
1 + 3s
[(l + s)(l + 2s)− s2φ]a = slφv + l(l + 2s− φs)a¯
(l + s)2aˆ = slφv + a¯l(l + 2s− φs) + asφ.
Given that φ ∈ [0, 1/2], these equations imply that a is an increasing aﬃne function
of a¯, and so is aˆ. Now, for a¯ = v, these equalities lead to the solution with myopic
consumers namely, p and pˆ, for which we know that pˆ < v. Therefore, there exists A1 < v
such that for all a¯ ∈ (A1, v), δ(V ∗H − V ∗L ) < a¯s, i.e. there exists an admissible solution
(a, aˆ,H∗(aˆ), V ∗L , V
∗
H) to the system (10)- (14) (with aˆ < a¯): this solution enables us to
construct the candidate equilibrium by writing down that payoﬀs are constant within the
supports of price distributions:
po(l + sH∗(po)) = a(l + s) for po ∈ (a, aˆ) (15)
pn(l + sH∗(pn))− δH∗(pn)(V ∗H − V ∗L ) = a¯l for pn ∈ (aˆ, a¯) (16)
q(l + s∗Lo(q) + sL∗n(q)) + δ(1− L∗n(q))(V ∗H − V ∗L ) = a(l + 2s) for q ∈ (a, a¯), (17)
with L∗o(.) having support (a, aˆ) and L
∗
n(.) having support (aˆ, a¯] and a mass at a¯.
Step 2: condition for no deviation by consumers when they anticipate
future prices on the equilibrium path.
Consider first the condition for a young loyal consumer of the L-firm to buy at some
period, given the continuation equilibrium path: for all (pn, q) such that pn < q,
v − pn + β[v − EL∗o [po]] ≥ β[v − EL∗n [pn]]
and for all (pn, q) such that pn > q,
v − pn ≥ β[v − EH∗[q]].
The first condition always holds while the second requires that it be satisfied for the
highest possible value of pn, i.e.:
v − a¯ ≥ β(v − EH∗[q]).
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The case of a young loyal consumer of the H-firm leads to the same condition.
Finally, consider the case of young shoppers. They buy from the lowest price firm
instead of buying from the highest price firm provided for all (pn, q),
v − inf{pn, q}+ β[v − EL∗o,H∗[ inf{po, q}]]
≥ v − sup{pn, q}+ β[v − EL∗n [pn]],
and instead of refraining from buying provided for all (pn, q),
v − inf{pn, q}+ β[v − EL∗o,H∗[ inf{po, q}]]
≥ β[v − EL∗n,H∗[ inf{pn, q}]].
Since EL∗o,H∗ [ inf{po, q}] ≤ aˆ < EL∗n[pn] and EL∗o,H∗ [ inf{po, q}] ≤ EL∗n,H∗ [ inf{pn, q}],
both inequalities are always fulfilled.
To summarize, if v − a¯ ≥ β(v − EH∗[q]) and consumers anticipate prices on the equi-
librium path, all loyal consumers buy from their corresponding firm and all shoppers buy
from the lowest-price firm.
We will concentrate on a¯ that solves this condition as an equality: v−a¯β = v − EH∗ [q]
(remember that H∗(.) depends a¯). The LHS of this equality is decreasing in a¯, from vβ > v
for a¯ = 0, to 0 when a¯ = v. Since H∗(.) depends continuously on a¯ and has a support
strictly included in (0, v) for all a¯, the RHS is bounded away from 0 for a¯ ≤ v. It follows
that for any A∗ < v, there exists β1(A
∗) > 0 such that for all β ∈ (0, β1(A∗)), there exists
a¯ ∈ (A∗, v) that solves v−a¯β = v − EH∗[q].
Step 3: considering the continuation strategies after a deviation by one
firm.
Up to now, we have only described the strategies on the equilibrium path, that is for
all prices within the support of their respective distributions. To complete the charac-
terization of the equilibrium, we need to give the nature of the strategies in subgames
following a deviation by one firm.18 Many deviations can be handled with very quickly
and we will see that only deviations above a¯ require some care.
18To describe strategies in all possible subgames, one would have to consider subgames with any
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Suppose that all behaviors are as specified in step 1 after a deviation in po,i; this is
natural since only old consumers are concerned and they will not be around in the future.
Deviating from po,H = v is clearly dominated for the H-firm. Deviating to po,L < a yields
the same demand as po,L = a for a smaller mark-up, hence dominated for the L-firm;
deviating to a¯ ≥ po,L > aˆ yields: po,L(l+ sH∗(po,L)), which is smaller than aˆ(l+ sH∗(aˆ)),
since on (aˆ, a¯), p(l + sH∗(p))− δH∗(p)(V ∗H − V ∗L ) is constant and hence, p(l + sH∗(p)) is
decreasing. A deviation to po,L > a¯ should optimally imply po,L = v for revenues equal to
vl on old consumers for the L-firm. such a deviation is not profitable if:
vl ≤ aˆ(l + sH∗(aˆ)) = a¯l + 2sφ
1 + 3s
((v − a¯)l + as).
Given how a has been determined at step 1, it is immediate that there exists A2 < v such
that for any a¯ ∈ (A2, v) and associated a, the above inequality is satisfied.
Consider now deviations in pn,i. Deviations below a can be immediately disregarded,
if they are treated in the continuation strategies as if no deviation had taken place: this is
so because the deviating firm then simply foregoes some profit it could have obtained by
charging precisely a. Deviations within (a, aˆ) for the L-firm are dealt with similarly, since
on this interval, p(l+ sH∗(p)) is constant and therefore, p(l+ sH∗(p))− δ(V ∗H −V ∗L )H∗(p)
is increasing, hence everywhere smaller than its value for aˆ.
The more complicated type of deviations occurs for pn,i > a¯. Suppose that the de-
viating firm at period t sets the price ptn,i = ρ ∈ (a¯, v]. This firm charges the highest
price at period t, so it gets no shoppers at period t. Whether it sells at t to its young
loyal depends on these consumers’ expectations about future prices in the continuation
subgame. Suppose that θl young loyal consumers buy from this deviating firm at period
t, θ ∈ [0, 1], then the situation at period t + 1 resembles the auxiliary game analyzed at
the preliminary step. Then, let us specify strategies using this auxiliary game equilibrium
strategies obtained for x = a¯ and ∆ = V ∗H − V ∗L . After the deviation, the deviating firm
allocation of consumers among the various segments of each firm, solve for a mixed behavior as in the
preliminary step, using ∆ = V ∗H − V ∗L and x = a¯. For β small enough, these behaviors would induce
consumers to behave as if myopic.
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charges v on its θl past consumers and plays according to Hθ(.) at period t+1, while the
non-deviating firm plays according to (Lθo(.), L
θ
n(.)). If both firms play this way at t+1 (or
deviate still charging below a¯), firms resume the strategies H∗(.) and (L∗o(.), L
∗
n(.)) that
are played repeatedly on the candidate equilibrium path afterwards. If another deviation
above a¯ occurs at τ ≥ t+ 1, inducing θ0l loyal consumers to buy from the deviating firm,
firms revert to Hθ
0
(.) and (Lθ
0
o (.), L
θ0
n (.)) at τ + 1 and resume the strategies H
∗(.) and
(L∗o(.), L
∗
n(.)) afterwards.
First, we focus on the consumers. On the equilibrium path, all prices are smaller
than a¯ and therefore loyal consumers buy from their firm and shoppers buy from the
lowest-price firm. In a subgame following a deviation at t characterized by θ, young loyal
consumers still face at t + 1the prospect of an expected price equal to EH∗[q] or EL∗n[pn]
at t + 2 if they decide to abstain from consuming at t + 1: therefore, with all prices
below a¯ they should also buy from their firm when young (see step 2). Finally, in case
of a deviation at t, the young loyal consumers of the deviating firm at t have to compare
consuming, i.e. enjoying an intertemporal utility of v − ρ, or abstaining and enjoying an
intertemporal utility of β[v − EHθ [q]]. Equilibrium requires that if θ ∈ (0, 1), then ρ and
θ are related by:
v − ρ = β[v − EHθ [q]],
while if θ = 0, then necessarily: v − ρ ≤ β[v − EH0[q]]. This enables us to define the
mapping R(.) that characterizes the highest price deviation above a¯ that induces exactly
θl young loyal consumers to buy still from the firm at t. R(1) = a¯, R(0) = v, and for
θ ∈ (0, 1), R(θ) ∈ ((1 − β)v, v), R(.) is continuously diﬀerentiable decreasing over (0, 1)
and 1β |dRdθ |=|
d[EHθ [q]]
dθ | is bounded.
We finally need to prove that for all θ, a deviation leading to θ, hence characterized
by ρ = R(θ), is not profitable for the deviating firm, given the hypothesized continuation.
Consider that at t, the L-firm deviates at R(θ) > a¯. It must be that:
V ∗L ≥ a(l + s) +R(θ)θl + δ[θlv + aθ((2− θ)l + 2s) + δV ∗L ].
Using the decomposition: V ∗L = a(l + s) + a¯l + δ[vl + a(l + 2s) + δV
∗
L ], the no-deviation
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condition by the L-firm is equivalent to:
δ[(aθ − a)(l + 2s)− (1− θ)l(v − aθ)] ≤ (a¯− θR(θ))l.
Given that 1β |dRdθ | is bounded, there exists β2 such that for all β ∈ [0, β2), the RHS is
strictly decreasing in θ; as it is null for θ = 1, it follows that the RHS is positive for
all θ < 1. Tedious but straightforward computations show that the LHS is equal to
(1− θ)lδ[ δ(V
∗
H−V ∗L )+a¯l
s+l − v]. For a¯ > A1, δ(V ∗H − V ∗L ) < a¯s and therefore the LHS is smaller
than (1− θ)lδ(a¯− v), that is the LHS is negative. The condition of no-deviation by the
L-firm is therefore satisfied.
Consider now a deviation at t by the H-firm to R(θ). It is not profitable if:
V ∗H ≥ vl +R(θ)θl + δ[θlv + aθ((2− θ)l + 2s) + δV ∗L ].
Using V ∗H = V
∗
L + (V
∗
H − V ∗L ), the same decomposition of V ∗L and the same rearranging of
terms, the condition can be written as:
δ[(aθ − a)(l + 2s)− (1− θ)l(v − aθ)] ≤ (a¯− θR(θ))l + (V ∗H − V ∗L ) + a(l + s)− vl.
A new term appears compared to the condition of no-deviation by the L-firm, which is:
a(l+s)−vl = (V ∗H−V ∗L )(1+ δH∗(aˆ))− (v− a¯)l. Given the analysis at step 1, there exists
A3 < v, such that for all a¯ > A3, this term is positive and therefore this no-deviation
condition holds when the condition for the L-firm holds.
To terminate, we have to look for the no-deviation condition of the Hθ
0
-firm and the
Lθ
0
-firm in the period immediately following a deviation (by the nowHθ
0
-firm) that lead to
θ0. The non profitability for the Lθ
0
-firm of a deviation leading to θ writes down (omitting
the profit on its previous consumers):
a¯l + δV ∗H ≥ R(θ)θl + δ[θlv + aθ((2− θ)l + 2s) + δV ∗L ].
Writing the LHS as: a¯l + δ[vl + a(l + 2s) + δV ∗L ] leads to the same condition as the no-
deviation condition by the L-firm. The non profitability for the Hθ
0
-firm of a deviation
leading to θ writes down (omitting the profit on its previous consumers):
((2− θ0)l + 2s)aθ0 + δV ∗L ≥ R(θ)θl + δ[θlv + aθ((2− θ)l + 2s) + δV ∗L ].
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We know that the RHS is smaller than V ∗H − vl (no-deviation of the H-firm), hence than
a(l + 2s) + δV ∗L . Moreover, a
θ0 ≥ a (preliminary step) and so:
((2− θ0)l + 2s)aθ0 ≥ a(l + 2s).
Hence, the no-deviation condition of the Hθ
0
-firm.
To conclude, let A∗ = sup{A1, A2, A3} < v and let β∗ = inf{β1(A∗), β2}, such that for
any β ∈ [0, β∗), the strategies characterized in the proof with a¯ solving v−a¯β = v−EH∗[q],
constitute an sequential equilibrium of the all game.
This completes the proof.
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